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  Recently, financial institutions have developed improved internal risk rating 
systems and emphasized the probability of default and loss given default. Also they have 
been affected by globalization and it became important to understand the way foreign 
banks operate. The probability of default is studied for 756 loans from a French bank: 
CIC- Banque SNVB. A binomial logit regression is used to estimate a model of the 
probability of default of an agribusiness loan. The results show that leverage, profitability 
and liquidity at loan origination are good indicators of the probability of default. The loan 
length is another good indicator of the probability of default. Also it is more accurate to 
develop a model for each type of collateral (activity).  
 




As the New Basel Capital Accord encourages financial institutions to develop and 
strengthen risk management systems, banks are interested in obtaining a more objective 
rating of loan portfolios. High levels of indebtedness imply a higher incident of default 
and increasing risk for lenders. Because agricultural credit conditions change rapidly, the 
adoption of technology in the sector has caused the shifting of production risk to financial 
risk (Stover, Teas and Gardner 1985). 
Quantifying financial risks and developing an effective portfolio management 
strategy are important objectives of banks. Banks consequently devote many resources to 
developing internal risk models.  Financial risk can be divided into credit, market and 
operational risk but the largest component is credit risk (Gup 2004). By developing an 
accurate credit risk rating system, banks will be able to identify loans that have lower 
probability of default versus loans that have a higher probability of default.  Thus, they 
will better rate the loans, price the loans, and may benefit from capital savings. 
While financial institutions often focus on credit risk evaluation, another trend 
that affects them is globalization. Though the banking industry appears to be far from 
globally integrated, many banks are expanding their reach in many countries as 
regulatory barriers to international banking have been relaxed (Berger and Smith 2003).  
In this study, we focused on a French bank that serves agriculture: Crédit 
Industriel et Commercial- Société Nancéienne Varin-Bernier (CIC-Banque SNVB). After 
analyzing the differences in financial reporting methods and credit scoring approaches, 
we examined financial ratios that are important for evaluating the probability of default. 
  1We also examined whether the length of the loan and the commitment amount are 
significant predictors of the probability of default of a loan. Finally, we examine whether 
a model for each type of farming activity should be developed. 
 
Financial reporting practice and credit scoring approach in France: overview 
Financial reporting practice   
Previous research has identified a dichotomy in accounting systems around the 
world: the Anglo-American model versus the Continental European model. Major 
differences exist between these two types of accounting models in terms of valuation and 
presentation methods (Nobes 1998). In the Anglo-American model, financial statements 
include a balance sheet, income statement, statement showing changes in equity, cash 
flow statement, accounting policies and explanatory notes. The European model only 
requires a balance sheet, profit and loss account and notes on the accounts. The number 
of periods disclosed is another difference. American companies usually disclose two or 
three years’ figures whereas in France only one comparative period is usually disclosed.  
Furthermore, in France as in the United States, the balance sheet is usually 
presented horizontally with two blocks side by side. Nevertheless, there is a difference in 
the classification of assets and liabilities. French accounting gives a priority to the 
classification by nature. In the United States, figures in the balance sheet are presented in 
order of decreasing liquidity and maturity. Moreover, fixed assets are shown in three 
columns in France: gross value, accumulated depreciation and net value while often, only 
the net value is reported in the U.S. The valuation of assets in the farm sector differs: 
assets are valued on a cost-basis in France while they are at adjusted market-value in the 
  2United States. For example, the asset value of a vineyard bought 30 years ago is its costs 
30 years ago in France. In the U.S., the asset value of this vineyard is its market value so 
its asset value is much higher than the one appearing in the French balance sheet.  
As far as the income statement is concerned, the most traditional format used in 
France is the nature of expense method; expenses are aggregated according to their 
nature: transport, tax or salaries for example. The United States adopts the function of 
expense method; expenses are classified according to their purpose: commercial, 
distribution, etc. (Nobes and Parker 2002).  
Explanations for differences in financial reporting practice 
Several researchers examined the factors that influence the differences in national 
accounting standards. Nobes (1983) defined two accounting-system categories: micro-
based (the U.S.) versus macro-based (France). Micro-based systems are complex, less 
conservative and present higher disclosure than macro-based ones. According to Doupnik 
and Salter (1995), the legal system is another explanation. The U.S. has a common-law 
heritage, which generally is less rigid and allows for more discretion in application than 
code-based law traditions (France). The source of financing, according to Zysman (1983), 
explains the gap as well. The U.S. has a capital market based system, so shareholders do 
not necessarily have privileged relationship with companies, which is why public 
disclosure of financial information is required. France is considered to have a credit-
based system. Radebaugh and Gray (1997) indicate that the government is the major 
source of financing in France and it has strong relationships with companies. Therefore, 
companies are concerned with the protection of creditors and the calculation of 
distributable profit. The Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance dimension is also linked to the 
  3differences in accounting standards of the two countries (Gray 1988). The uncertainty 
avoidance dimension measures how people feel comfortable towards ambiguity. France, 
contrary to the U.S., ranks high on uncertainty avoidance which means that they prefer 
formal rules.  
Internationalization of financial reporting 
Creditors are more and more international so they are interested in international 
accounting. Today, two frameworks of international accounting standards exist: U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS. Tarca (2004) examined the reporting practices during 1999-2000 of 
companies from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan and Australia in order to 
determine if companies voluntary use “international standards” instead of national 
standards. The study shows that 35% of the foreign listed and domestic-only listed 
companies voluntary used international standards. Companies using “international 
standards” tend to be larger, have more foreign revenue and are listed in foreign stock 
exchanges. U.S. GAAP seems to be the most common choice among the companies 
studied for the 1999-2000 period. 
Credit scoring approach of CIC  
In France, each bank builds its own credit risk rating system and none of them are 
public contrary to the United States. No research about the topic is published because 
banks have their own internal researchers. The French group CIC segmented its clientele 
into 8 markets and developed a specific credit scoring model for each of them. The 
agricultural segment, one of those 8 segments, is currently using two separate models to 
assign a score to a loan application, which is the combination of two grades.  
  4The first model, called financial model, is based on ratios obtained from the 
balance sheet and the second model, operating model, is based on the way the farm 
operates. In the first model, the ratios are: 
-  total equity /financial debt (r1) 
-  other debt /current assets (r2) 
-  bank interest/operating profit before depreciation and amortization (r3) 
-  cash balance*365/cost of goods sold (r4).  
The other model uses six criteria to assign the second grade:  
-  a risk indicator based on the unpaid (r5) 
-  monthly average of creditor balance over the past year (r6)  
-  number of days over the allowed spending limit during the past year (r7) 
-  monthly average of balance on checking account (r8) 
-  three months average debtor balance over three month average creditor 
balance (r9) 
-  total savings of the borrower (personal and professional accounts), (r10) 
The algorithms showing the calculation of the two grades are provided in table 1. The 
two grades obtained from the two models are aggregated to calculate the score, which is 
used to categorize the loan applications into 9 risk classes that are related to the Mac 
Donough credit scoring as shown in table 2. 
This new scoring model has been implemented in 2003 so all the information 
necessary to calculate the score is not available in the bank’s historical data information 
system. Prior to the implementation of this scoring model, approval relied heavily on the 
subjective judgment of the lender. The lender was analyzing the borrower’s financial 
  5position, evaluating the firm’s management and previous repayment histories. At this 
point, it is difficult to tell what percentage of the approval decision is based on the score 
or the judgment of the lender. Besides the financial ratios evaluated with the scoring 
model, there are many factors that can only be evaluated by the lender: the family 
situation, the farmer’s management expertise or non farm activities. 
 
Background 
Definition and purpose of credit risk rating systems 
Lopez and Saidenberg (2000) define credit risk as the degree of value fluctuations 
in debt instruments and derivatives due to changes in the underlying credit quality of 
borrowers. They identify two main concepts of credit risk that differ in the definition of 
credit losses. Default models are widely used and focus on the probability of default, 
while mark-to-market or multi-state models evaluate how changes in rating class affect 
the loan market value.  
  Credit-scoring models examine the creditworthiness of customers by assigning 
them to various risk groups. These models provide predictions of default probabilities by 
using statistical classification techniques, and they group them by risk class. Two sets of 
issues must be addressed before modeling credit risk. First, the accuracy of the inputs is 
critical. Once the credit risk model is constructed, it is important to validate because 
historical data do not usually span sufficiently long time periods.  
  The purpose of credit-scoring models is to assist the risk evaluation and 
management process of individual customers and loan portfolios. Credit-scoring tools are 
necessary to assist the loan officer in making loan decisions, controlling and monitoring 
  6loan portfolio risk and isolating loans that need additional attention (Obrecht, 1989). The 
fundamental goal of a credit risk rating system is to estimate the risk of a given 
transaction. The “building block “ for quantifying credit risk is Expected Loss (EL), the 
loss that can be expected from holding an asset. This is calculated as the product of three 
components: the probability of default (PD), the loss given default (LGD), and the 
exposure at default (EAD). EL is defined as follows: 
EL = PD*LGD*EAD 
The probability of default (PD) is defined as the frequency that a loan will default 
and is expressed in percentage terms. The loss given default (LGD) measures the cost for 
the financial institution when the loan defaults. It is expressed in percentage terms. The 
exposure at default (EAD) is the amount of money outstanding when the default occurs.  
The ultimate goal is to provide a measure of the loss expected for booking a credit and 
the capital required to support it.  Most rating systems use a two-dimensional scale to 
solve this problem, with the probability of default and the loss given default being 
quantified separately (Yu, Garside and Stoker 2001).  
  Czuszak (2002) confirms the importance of the probability of default stating that 
credit risk measurement and management is found in the probability and financial 
consequences of obligator default. Gustafson, Pederson and Gloy (2005) list the 
numerous costs involved when default occurs. Featherstone and Boessen (1994) studied 
loan loss severity in agriculture and computed the expected loss by multiplying by EAD 
and LGD. Katchova and Barry (2005) utilized the three components, PD, EAD and LGD, 
to model the expected loss encountered when default occurs. 
 
  7Approaches of credit risk evaluation 
  Gustafson, Beyer and Barry (1991) defined two types of approaches to credit risk 
assessment: the transactional approach which focuses on credit risk assessment tools, and 
the relational approach which in addition to credit scoring models, relies on the 
relationship between lenders and borrowers so as to evaluate others factors such as 
management capacity. The CIC Banque SNVB credit scoring approach uses the second 
approach. The traditional approach to agricultural lending relies on the relationship 
between the loan officer and the borrower. This relationship allows for a reduction in the 
asymmetric information between borrower and lender that arises from the fact that 
borrowers are familiar with their business, financial position and repayment intentions, 
and those characteristics are not easily observable by lenders. The other approach, 
transactional, places a greater reliance on financial ratios and places less focus on a 
relationship. While the goal of a risk rating system is to produce accurate and consistent 
ratings, professional judgment and experience are allowed as a part of the rating process. 
Judgmental rating systems are more costly but the benefits may outweigh the costs for 
larger banks.  
  In order to measure the accuracy of risk rating systems that employ both 
judgmental and statistical analysis, Splett et al.(1994) created a joint experience and 
statistical approach of credit scoring. The results from the experience were used as 
dependent variables in a logit regression model. The results indicated relatively high 
success of the statistical model in replicating the ratings from the experience model. 
  8Credit risk rating models 
  Ellinger, Splett and Barry (1992) surveyed lenders to determine the use of credit 
evaluation procedures. They found that 62% of respondents used a credit scoring model 
to assist in loan approval, loan pricing and loan monitoring. This proportion increased 
with bank size.  
  Most of the actual credit rating systems rely on financial ratios but some research 
has been extended to nonfinancial ratios. Stover, Teas and Gardner (1985) extended the 
loan decision to loan pricing, collateral and changing market conditions. The decision 
variables for the loan were character and ability of management, the conditions of the 
agricultural market, compliance with the bank’s loan policy, collateral and loan pricing. 
To test these variables, 44 agricultural lending officers were asked to sort hypothetical 
loans from the most preferred loan to the least preferred one. OLS regression was used to 
estimate the aggregate utility model. The results confirm the important role of 
management ability and character of the borrower.  
  Gallagher (2001) looked at nonfinancial characteristics between unsuccessful and 
successful loans by including a combined experience variable comprised of the loan 
officer’s experience and the agribusiness manager’s experience. The model prediction 
success rate went from 80% to 97.5% with the inclusion of this information.   
 
Data  
Data were provided by CIC Banque SNVB, bank located in north-eastern France 
(figure 1). CIC is a French bank group which is comprised of 9 regional banks, CIC 
Banque SNVB is one of them. CIC joined the Crédit Mutuel in 1998 and today, the 
  9Crédit Mutuel-CIC group is the 4
th largest bank group in France. At the end of 2003, CIC 
Banque SNVB’s net income was 341 million Euros with about 2,500 employees were 
working for it. 
CIC Banque SNVB has recently targeted the agricultural market because this 
region is one of the most efficient regions in agricultural and wine production: the Marne, 
Seine et Marne and Aube. The potential CIC Banque SNVB territory is 46,000 farms, 
where the chief activities are crops, milk and wine production. This bank targets 
diversified farms whose sales are greater than 150,000 Euros. More than 2,500 farmers 
were customers of the CIC Banque SNVB as of October 30, 2004. The typology of the 
clientele is depicted in figure 2. The activities of the customers are diverse; the main 
activities are wine production and crops, which represents respectively 27 % and 20% of 
the clientele.  
The loan data obtained from the CIC Banque SNVB were loans that originated 
between January 1, 1999 and May 31, 2004. The data were categorized by customer level 
and loan level. The customer level data corresponds mainly to the financial situation of 
the customer every year. A customer may be present many times in the dataset because 
each year his information is entered. Even though financial statements are added through 
the years, the financial statements at the origination time are saved. This study focuses on 
the origination data. The customer level data are the customer ID, year of the financial 
data, total equity, level of participation of partner if applicable, long-term debt, short-term 
debt, working capital, cash balance, total assets, total equity and liabilities, sales, 
operating profit before depreciation and amortization, bank interest, intermediate income 
and net income. The loan level data are updated at least every year or once a major event 
  10affects the quality of the loan. The data reflects the quality (default or non-default) of the 
loans as of May 31, 2004. The loan level data contain customer ID, date of origination, 
date of maturity, code of loan and description, commitment amount, length, amount due 
that has been borrowed, type of collateral, indicators of default: payment past due 90 days 
or increase of the provision for loan loss, frequency of payment and dominant activity of 
the business. The data are aggregated so the loan information is linked to the customer 
financial data available at origination. 
The original data contained 2,600 agricultural loans booked between 1999 and 
2004. The customer data were linked to the loan to match the year of origination with 
financial information from the previous year. Some information was lost because 
complete financial information was not available for all loans. Among the 756 remaining 
loans, 6.35% of the loans defaulted. 
 
Methodology 
Binomial logit regression is used to estimate a model predictive of the probability 
of default (PD) of an agribusiness loan and further identify the significant components of 
non-defaulted loans. 
Model I 
The first model is based on origination financial ratios used by the credit scoring 
model of CIC-Banque SNVB. The purpose of this regression is to examine the French 
credit scoring model. Model I is as follows: 
    Ln([PD] i /1-[PD] i) =  0 β + 1 β  leverage i +  2 β  other leverage i + 3 β  coverage i + ui  
where i refers to the loan and u to the error term. 
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  This model is developed using origination financial ratios to examine which 
origination variables affect the expected probability of default (PD) of a loan: 
Ln([PD]i/1-[PD] i)=  0 β +  1 β  leveragei + 2 β  profitabilityi + 3 β liquidityi +  ui




The dependent variable of both models is log odds ratio of default. This binary 
variable takes the value 1 if the loan defaulted and 0 otherwise. Default is defined as a 
loan that has not been repaid at least once within 90 days or more since the payment was 
due.  
Independent variables in model I 
In model I, the first ratio, leverage, is measured as total equity over financial debt. 
Financial debt is defined as all the debt to financial institution. The higher the amount of 
equity compared to the amount of debt, the lower the risk of default. The sign of this 
coefficient is expected to be negative. The definition of the second ratio, other leverage, 
is other debt over current assets. Other debt corresponds to short-term debt to suppliers, 
tax and social benefit creditors. The higher the amount of short-term debt, the lower the 
repayment capacity, and the higher the risk of default. The last ratio utilized in model I is 
a measure of coverage, which is defined as bank interest over operating profit before 
depreciation and amortization.  The higher the amount of debt, the higher the amount of 
  12bank interest so the coefficient of this ratio is expected to be positive as well. Also, the 
lower the profit, the higher the ratio, and the lower the probability of default. 
Independent variables in model II 
Three origination variables are included in model II: leverage, profitability and 
liquidity. Leverage corresponds to debt ratio and is defined as total liabilities divided by 
total assets. The debt ratio shows the proportion of a company's assets which are financed 
through debt. If the ratio is less than one-half, most of the company's assets are financed 
through equity. If the ratio is greater than one-half, most of the company's assets are 
financed through debt. Firms with a high debt ratio are said to be "highly leveraged," and 
are more likely to default. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient is expected to be positive.  
The profitability variable is defined as the rate of return on assets, which equals the fiscal 
year’s net income plus interest divided by the total assets of the company. It is expressed 
as a decimal in this study. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative since 
higher profitability should result in a smaller risk of default. Liquidity is defined as 
working capital and equals current assets minus current liabilities. This number can be 
positive or negative. Companies that have a lot of working capital may be more 
successful since they can expand quickly with internal resources. Companies with low 
working capital may lack the funds necessary for growth. This variable will be expressed 
in Euros.  
Two other variables are also investigated: the length of the loan and the 
commitment amount. The length of the loan has been computed by calculating the 
number of months between the origination date and the maturity date of the loan. The 
intuition for the coefficient would be that the longer the loan, the lower the amount of 
  13principal repaid, the higher the risk of default. The commitment amount variable 
represents the amount of principal that has been approved and booked. Roessler (2003) 
proved the loan size does not significantly influence whether or not a loan will enter 
default status.  
Additional characteristics 
  A final objective of the study is to examine whether farm type is related to the 
probability of default. The sample obtained from the CIC-Banque SNVB is classified into 
four types as shown in table 3: agriculture, wine and champagne production, agricultural 
services and others. 
Summary statistics 
The summary statistics are provided in table 4 and table 5. There were 758 loans 
approved of which 48 defaulted, leading to a default percentage of 6.33%.  
Table 4 corresponds to model I. The mean for leverage is higher for the non-
defaulted loans than the defaulted loans, which is as expected. For other leverage, the 
mean is higher for defaulted loans as expected Also, as expected, the mean for coverage 
is higher for defaulted loans.  
Table 5 corresponds to model II. Leverage has a smaller coefficient of variation 
than profitability and liquidity. The length of the loan varies from 6 months to 20 years. 
The mean for leverage is higher for the defaulted loans than the non-defaulted loans as 
expected. Profitability for both defaulted and non-defaulted loans is similar. We expected 
profitability to be larger for non-defaulted loans. Also, as expected, liquidity is higher for 
non-defaulted loans. The mean loan length is 64.72 months for non-defaulted loans and 
  1476.83 for defaulted loans. The longer the loan, the higher is the risk of default. Finally, 
non-defaulted loans have a higher commitment amount than defaulted ones. 
 
Regression Results 
The regression results indicate that only model II was statistically significant in 
predicting the probability of default.  
Probability of default results: Model I 
  Model I utilized three of the origination ratios included in the CIC credit scoring 
model: leverage, other leverage and coverage. The binary logit regression results are 
presented in Table 6. The signs obtained for the coefficients are as expected. 
Nevertheless, the chi-square statistic indicated that none of the variables are statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level. The likelihood ratio test (1.62), distributed as a 
chi-square distribution, indicates that the null hypothesis ( i β =0 for all variables) cannot 
be rejected. The model is not statistically significant in predicting the probability of 
default.  
Probability of default results: Model II 
Model II utilizes three independent variables: leverage, profitability and liquidity. 
The results of the regression are displayed in Table 7. The chi-square statistic indicated 
that all the variables are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The 
coefficient for leverage is positive and the coefficients for profitability and liquidity are 
negative, all as expected. The result of the likelihood ratio test (18.17), distributed as a 
chi-square distribution, indicates that the null hypothesis,  i β =0 for all variables, is 
rejected. The model is statistically significant in predicting the probability of default. 
  15To interpret the economic content of the coefficients, further computations need 
to be made. For a binary logit model, the impact of a one-unit increase of the independent 
variable, other explanatory variables held constant, is not the probability of default itself. 
The probability of default (Pi) is given by: 
∑ ∑ + + + = )) ( exp 1 /( ) exp( 0 0 ij j ij j i x x P β β β β  
To estimate the marginal effect on the probability of default of one variable when 
the two others are held constant, the means for two of the variables were multiplied by 
their coefficients while one of the variables multiplied by the coefficient was varied. The 
marginal effect is evaluated between one standard deviation below and above the mean of 
the variable of interest.  
Figure 3 represents the probability of default as one of the variable of model II 
varies. Only model II was graphed because it is statistically significant in predicting the 
probability of default. As leverage increases from .20 to 1, while the profitability and the 
liquidity are held constant, the probability of default increases from 2.33% to 4.73%. As 
the profitability increases from -0.8 to 1.2, the probability of default decreases from 
6.05% to 2.47%.As liquidity increases from -100,000 to 200,000 Euros, the probability of 
default decreases from 8.9% to 5.3%. 
Effects of the length of the loan on the probability of default 
The length of the loan was examined to determine if longer loans have higher 
probability of default by adding the variable length to model II. Similarly to Model II, the 
results of table 8 indicate that all the origination ratios are statistically significant at the 
95% level and have the expected signs. The length of the loan is statistically significant in 
  16predicting the probability of default of loans; the longer the loan length is, the higher the 
probability of default.  
Effects of commitment amount on the probability of default 
Model II was re-estimated with commitment amount added. Each origination ratio 
is statistically significant at the 95% level and their signs are as expected (table 9). The 
coefficient estimate of commitment amount is not statistically different from zero, thus 
loan size does not have a statistically significant impact on whether a loan will enter 
default status. This is similar to the findings of Featherstone, Roessler and Barry (2006). 
Loan Type Results 
The loans are further analyzed according to collateral type. Those activities are 
agriculture, wine production, services and others. For each type of activity, the 
independent variables from model II were regressed on the default outcome. For the 
agricultural model, all the signs obtained are as expected but only the working capital 
variable is statistically significant at the 95% level (table 10). The overall model is 
statistically significant in predicting the probability of default of loans as indicated by the 
likelihood ratio chi-square. The statistics of the wine production and agricultural services 
models indicate that neither the independent variables nor the overall model are good 
indicators of the probability of default of loans. The last category of activities is mainly 
composed of hunting, forestry and fishing oriented businesses. All the coefficients of the 
independent variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant in 
predicting the probability of default of loans except the working capital variable.  
In order to compare if it would be beneficial to implement a different model for 
each type of activity, we use a likelihood ratio test. The log likelihood statistics of the 
  17four categories are summed and subtracted from the log likelihood statistic of model II. 
The difference is distributed as a chi-square statistic; the number of degrees of freedom 
equals the number of sub-samples minus 1 times the number of parameters estimated. 
The result of the likelihood ratio test (30.82) indicates that we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient estimates are equal across loan type.  
 
Conclusion  
With the implementation of the New Basel Capital Accord, financial institutions 
have been developing credit scoring models. 
First, three of the ten indicators utilized by CIC Banque SNVB to evaluate the 
credit risk were tested.  Those three origination ratios were leverage, other leverage and 
coverage. These variables were not statistically significant at the 95% in predicting 
whether a loan would default using a logit model. The credit scoring actually 
implemented at CIC Banque SNVB may not predict default well based upon historical 
data. The conclusion must however be tempered because only three of the ratios were 
tested.  
We illustrated that three other origination variables are important predictors of 
probability of default of the loans from the CIC Banque SNVB portfolio: leverage, 
profitability and liquidity.  The commitment amount was not statistically significant 
while the loan length was statistically significant in predicting the probability of default.  
Both models emphasized the importance of leverage as an indicator of the 
probability of default. 
  18Differences exist between default models based on the type of farming activity. 
Thus, it is preferential and more accurate to develop a model for each type of activity 
though this requires more data to estimate. Under the New Basel Capital Accord, twelve 
groups of exposures have replaced the four initial groups defined by Basel I. It shows the 
importance of a better segregation of customers as a potential for increased risk-
sensitivity due to a larger range of weights. 
  By developing credit scoring models, banks will be able to measure portfolio risk, 
price loans and improve their internal risk management at the same time. Banks may 
benefit from lower capital requirements and lender will also better rate the risk.  
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  21Table 1.  Algorithm for Grade Calculations 
 
Financial Model    Operating Model 
If  0 ≤ r1 ≤ 0.15  then s1=-2.2798    If r5=0  then s5=-5.6846 
If  0.15< r1 ≤ 0.50  then s1=-1.3921    If r5=1  then s5=-2.0269 
If  0.50< r1 ≤1.20  then s1=-2.0102    If not s5=0   
If  r1>1.20  then s1=-1.5840      
If not s1=0        
        
If 0≤r2≤55     then s3=1.6411    If  r6≤0  then s6=0.9057 
If 55<r2≤85  then s2=-1.1253    If  50<r6≤150  then s6=0.6436 
If 85<r2≤120  then s2=-0.6771    If not s6=0   
If not s2=0        
        
If -9999≤ r3 ≤-105  then s3=1.6411    If  0<r7≤3  then s7=-2.6316 
If -105< r3 ≤-60  then s3=1.5291    If  3<r7≤9  then s7=-1.9076 
If -60< r3 ≤0  then s3=1.7963    If not s7=0   
If not s3=0        
        
If 0≤ r4 ≤0.12  then s4=-1.8159    If  r8≤-4500  then s8=1.4607 
If 0.12<r4≤0.18  then s4=-0.9122    If  -4500<r8<0  then s8=0.7160 
If not s4=0     If not s8=0   
        
Fcalc = 1.5736+s1+s2+s3+s4    If r9≤0  then s9=-0.9507 
     If 0<r9≤0.05  then s9=-0.8818 
     If not s9=0   
        
F. Grade= 1/(1+exp(-Fcalc)    If  r10≤150  then s10=1.4420 
     If  r10>15500  then s10=-0.5451 
     If not s10=0   
        
     Ocalc = 3.1967+s5+s6+s7+s8+s9+s10 
     O. Grade= 1/(1+exp(-Ocalc) 
  22 
Table 2.  Calculation of the Score 
 
If F. Grade >0 then score=  Grade O Grade F . * . 
 
If not, Score= O. Grade 
 












>0.04 and  ≤ 0.09 
>0.09 and ≤ 0.18 
>0.18 and ≤ 0.31 
>0.31 and ≤ 0.45 
>0.45 and ≤ 0.60 
>0.60 and ≤ 0.75 












a According to the study led by the bank to develop this credit scoring model 
Source: Coisnon 2004 
 





Figure 1.  CIC group 

















































Number of Customers 
 
Figure 2. CIC Banque SNVB as October 2004 by farm type 
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Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics CIC Banque SNVB, Model I variables 
 




Leverage 7.3899 60.86518 -71.5  896
Other leverage  .7698 2.506706 -14.681  62.5
Coverage .09767 1.8926 -32.3  12.41177
Observations 758  
Non-Defaulted Loans 
Leverage 7.6708 62.8263 -71.5  896
Other leverage  .7337 2.5655 -14.6808  62.5
Coverage .0941 1.9539 -32.3  12.4118
Observations 710  
Defaulted loans 
Leverage 3.2345 10.2605 -3.2214  50.5
Other leverage  1.3054 1.2722 0.0326  6.8214
Coverage .1502 .4266 -1.1222  .9831
Observations 48  
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Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics CIC Banque SNVB, Model II variables 




Leverage   .759306 .5718016 .0055494  13.67742
Profitability .2283852 .9898789 -.702163  26.45161
Liquidity €  389,955 1,554,947 -491,000  25,000,000
Length (months)  65.4934 38.13695 6  240
Amount €  63,729.5 144,551.7 1,456.19  2,457,000
Non defaulted loans 
Leverage   .7489 .5790 .0055494  13.6774
Profitability .2284 1.0171 -.3702  26.4516
Liquidity €  408,484.7 1,603,458 -273,000  25,000,000
Length (month)  64.7268 36.7919 6  240
Amount €  64,232 147,781.8 1,520  2,457,000
Observations 710  
Defaulted loans 
Leverage   .91485 .4266 .1399  2.7295
Profitability .2285 .4204 -.7022  1.8522
Liquidity €  68,510.42 217,730.3 -491,000  613,700
Length (month)  76.8333 53.53 24  240
Amount €  56,296.51 83,876.07 1,456.19  488,000
Observations 48  
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Table 6.  Logistic Regression Results of Probability of Default using Model I 
Variable  Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  Chi-square P>Chi-Square 
Intercept -2.72 .15556  -17.49 0.000 
Leverage -0.0259  0.00637  -0.41  0.684 
Other leverage  0.0392  0.03179  1.23  0.217 
Coverage 0.0174  0.09314  0.19  0.852 
Likelihood ratio      1.62  0.6556 







   
Predictive ability of model I (cutoff  7% default) 
Correct Sensitivity  Specificity 
92.74% 6.25% 98.59% 
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Table 7. Logistic Regression Results of Probability of Default using Model II  
Variable Coefficient  estimate  Standard 
Error  Chi-square P>Chi-Square
Intercept -3.09140** .34247 -9.03  0.012
Leverage   .91582* .36272 2.52  0.045
Profitability -.46719* .23322 -2.00  0.040
Liquidity -1.86E-06** 9.08E-07 -2.05  0.000
Likelihood ratio  18.17  0.0004








Predictive ability of the model (cutoff= 7% default) 
Correct Sensitivity  Specificity 
67.02% 64.58%  67.18% 
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Figure 3. Probability of default as debt ratio, ROA or working capital varies
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Table 8. Logistic Regression Results of Probability of Default in the CIC-Banque SNVB  
 
Portfolio with Loan Length 
 
Variable  Coefficient 
estimate  Standard Error  Chi-square  P>Chi-Square 
Intercept -3.5961** .4345 -8.28  0.000
Leverage   .9386** .3658 2.57  0.010
Profitability -.4639* .2323 -2.00  0.046
Liquidity -1.82E-06* 8.92E-07 -2.04  0.042
Length 0.0068* .0033 2.07  0.039
Likelihood ratio  22.04  0.0002







    
Predictive ability of the model (cutoff  7% default) 
Correct Sensitivity  Specificity 
69.39% 56.25%  70.28% 
 
*, ** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9. Logistic Regression Results of the Probability of Default in the CIC-Banque SNVB  
 
Portfolio with Commitment Amount  
 
Variable  Coefficient 
estimate  Standard Error  Chi-square  P>Chi-
Square 
Intercept -3.1545** .3485 -9.05  0.000
Leverage   .9009* .3650 2.47 0.014
Profitability -.4547* .2315 -1.96  0.049
Liquidity -1.98E-06* 8.85E-07 -2.24  0.025
Commitment amount  1.63E-06 1.61E-06 1.01  0.313
Likelihood ratio  19.00  0.0008








Predictive ability of the model (cutoff 7% default) 
Correct Sensitivity Specificity 
67.94% 58.33%  68.59% 
 
*, ** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 10. Logistic Regression Results of the Probability of Default for Loans associated to  
 
Business Specialized in Agriculture, Wine production, Agricultural Services and Others 
 
Variable Agricultural  Wine  production  Services  Others 
Intercept -2.4944** -2.0079* -2.6898  -3.3958**
Leverage   .4141 -.3466 -.4262  1.6955**
Profitability -2.3695 -1.9268 -.2829  -.8328**
Liquidity -8.71E-06** -1.54E-06 -1.01E-05  -1.25E-07
LR chi-square  20.24* 4.59 4.22  10.23*































*, ** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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